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 As the 39
th
 President of the United States, Jimmy Carter entered office confident in his 
human rights policy and his ability to reinvigorate the moral character of the United States.  
Although eager and well-intentioned, Carter had no idea how much satisfaction and defeat he 
would feel from the pressures of upholding this policy.  He envisioned the United States 
reemerging as a world leader, not only in power and influence, but as a moral compass pointing 
the way toward more humanitarian-aimed politics.  Carter’s human rights policy attempted to 
combine two extremely opposing political theories: self-interest driven realism and a morally and 
philosophically driven idealism.  These two contrasting ideologies played an immeasurable role 
in the success and failure of Carter’s human rights policy during his four years in office.  Carter 
attempted to combine these ideologies by insisting on formulating foreign policy consistent with 
the projected moral character of the United States.  America’s security and economic concerns 
abroad often restricted his adherence to the human rights policy.  Nowhere is this better 
demonstrated than in U.S. relations in Southeast Asia and China.  Carter’s human rights policy 
took a back seat to the normalization of relations with China, and to U.S. interests in the region, 
instead of guiding the world in condemning the most egregious human rights violations of the 
Khmer Rouge. 
The “enunciation of the concept of human rights constitute[d] a significant development 
in contemporary political ideology because it introduce[d] an ultimate concept as the governing 
principle for political action.”
1
  But this human rights policy raised more questions than it 
answered, particularly in its application in relationship to U.S. interests.  Carter’s campaign 
fueled his human rights policy, spearheading his run into the White House as the principle, and 
only somewhat defined policy for his administration.  Through his campaign and earliest days as 
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President, Carter used the human rights policy to appeal to a nation that had been recently misled 
and lied to, with the promise to both restore America’s faith in its government, as well as the 
world’s faith in U.S. power and presence.  His first speech as president set the tone for following 
the human rights policy as he declared that the “commitment to human rights must be absolute.”
2
  
He then addressed the people of other nations saying that “you can depend on the United States 
to remain steadfast in its commitment to human freedom and liberty.”
3
  With such statements 
Carter set a tone for his presidency and planned to lead the nation away from the scarred years of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, and into a more idealistic world where American morality would 




It was easy for Carter to become entangled in the promise of idealistic policies.  “Human 
rights came naturally” to him as a student of the “Jeffersonian/Wilsonian belief in the universal 
applicability of American ideals.”
5
  He repeated his confidence in human rights policy every 
chance he had.  Four months after his inauguration the importance of “the strands that connect 
our actions overseas with our essential character as a nation,” was again emphasized as important 
to “a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power 
and influence… for humane purposes.”
6
  Within the decade prior to Carter’s Presidency, the 
U.S.—along with the world—underwent growing pains that Carter contributed to “the moral 
failure of U.S. foreign policy” as he “equated the betrayal of American ideals with the neglect of 
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  Carter wanted to turn the tide on the demoralizing years of war and secrecy of 
American government.  His administration fully backed a human rights policy as Deputy 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher explained during the first year; “We believe our 
underlying principles must be reflected in American foreign policy if that policy is to have the 
support of our people and if it is to be effective.  Reflecting this conviction, the promotion of 
human rights has become a fundamental tenet of the foreign policy of the Carter 
Administration.”
8
  With the Carter administration’s commitment to human rights, and the 
president’s determination to lead a morally sound nation in international relations, Carter fully 
charged forward into a realistic world, wielding idealism as his most powerful weapon. 
While Carter was busy winning votes in America, the Khmer Rouge reshaped the 
Cambodian social, political, and geographical landscapes.  Within hours after seizing the capital 
city of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, leader of the brutal regime, Pol Pot, forced the inhabitants 
from the city into the countryside.  This forced relocation of people— including hospital patients, 
teachers, doctors, the elderly and extremely young— left many “dead or abandoned along the 
roads.”
9
  Those who reached the countryside then faced what the CIA called ‘extraordinarily 
harsh methods to ensure a docile and compliant population, purged of the corrupting influences 
of the past,” employed by a regime that neglected human rights in the pursuit of revolution.
10
  
The “‘planned’ massacre of tens of thousands of people” and the “‘systematic’ effort by the 
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Cambodian government to wipe out the upper and middle classes” continued as Carter took 
office, becoming an issue that his administration inevitably had to face.
11
 
Human rights, rhetorically and in theory, was a strong and stable weapon that supplied 
the Carter Administration’s arsenal with a common theme that could be evenly applied to every 
foreign policy decision.  In practice, though, Carter’s human rights policy was extremely fragile 
and lacked consistency.  The term ‘human rights’ offers broad and diverse interpretations 
depending on the context in which it is applied.  Defining the term is not a simple act because 
“vagueness is the root of its rhetorical power.”  This vagueness offers the ability to further 
conflicting agendas based on the chosen definition.
12
  This makes defining human rights a 
“theory issue,” and it allowed Carter to “implement[ ] polic[ies] in ways that allowed him 
maximum flexibility and diplomatic maneuverability.”
13
 
  Muddled by “over fifty covenants, conventions, resolutions, statements of principle, 
codes of conduct, and declarations about human rights on a global level,” as well as numerous 
non-governmental agencies that interpret and support human rights within their own context, the 
application of human rights policies offer varying degrees of interpretation.
14
  Even the Carter 
Administration’s definition and application of human rights policy changed over time, varying 
from person to person and between different situations.  Carter stated in his memoirs that “this 
policy would not be painless, nor could it be based on a blind adherence to consistency,” and that 
“the world cannot be improved by one dramatic act or by one nation’s transient policy; the 
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wheels of justice turn slowly- often very slowly.”
15
  Carter appreciated the difference between 
idealism and pragmatism.  Presidential Directive 21-40 proclaimed that “the policy shall be 
applied globally, but with due consideration to the cultural, political and historical characteristics 
of each nation, and to other fundamental U.S. interests with respect to the nation in question.”
16
  
Carter understood that there were limitations to his human rights policy and, although 
determined to make a difference, he recognized that the inconsistencies were a necessary evil to 
enable gradual change in worldwide human rights abuses. 
Many American accepted and supported Carter’s human rights policy, but when he 
“raised sensitive issues, such as human rights, that previous presidents had skirted, he quickly 
discovered that the rest of the world was less than eager for moral lessons from the United 
States.”
17
  Yet, Carter claims in his memoirs that “when we heads of state were alone our 
conversation was primarily about two subjects: human rights and the relationship between the 
rich and poor nations of the world.”
18
  This may be interpreted as Carter’s retrospective view of 
conversations he had with other heads of state, spotlighting the importance that he placed on, and 
felt for, his human rights policy.  But no matter how enthusiastic and motivated Carter and his 
administration were in applying human rights policy, U.S. interests superseded morality more 
often than he wanted in his presidency.  Nowhere is this more evident during the Carter 
Administration than in U.S. policy pertaining to Cambodia. 
Upon entering office, Carter implemented a human rights review intended to analyze the 
effectiveness of his human rights policy in transforming human rights standards around the 
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world.  A report assessing the human rights performance during the first half of Carter’s 
presidency suggested positive results: 
Over the past two years the human rights situation worldwide has 
improved, but in several countries deteriorated.  Worldwide trends 
indicate significant patterns of change.  Since January 1977 there 
have been human rights improvements in 41 countries, where 2 ½ 
billion people live…. The causes of the changes cited above are 
complex.  Increased U.S. attention to human rights practices have 
contributed to a global climate of greater sensitivity to the issue 




Yet, within this celebration of an effective human rights policy, the report also states that 
“conditions… continue to be deplorable in Cambodia, where Western influence generally has 
made no impact.”
20
  The situation in Cambodia received little attention from the Carter 
Administration, and in proportion to other areas of the world, very little attention from the media 
and the American people.  Although “the administration’s comments on Cambodia grew stronger 
and stronger as it acknowledged verified reports of extraordinarily inhumane treatment during 
1977 and 1978,” the administration failed to act upon its rhetoric.
21
  The American people were 
overwhelmed with issues that immediately pertained to their wallets and well-being and affected 
domestic policies in a much greater way than did the human rights violations in Cambodia.  
Globally, they “could easily overlook the Cambodian atrocities amid such [previous] events” as 
the fall of Saigon and the Kampuchean navy’s seizure of the cargo vessel the Mayaguez.
22
 
 Specific instances of media coverage concerning the brutality in Cambodia were few as 
reported by the organization, Accuracy in Media.  In 1976, the group found that the Washington 
Post and the New York Times printed only nine and four stories concerning Cambodia, 
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respectively.  In comparison to other countries (Chile, for example, being the subject of 58 
stories in the Washington Post and 66 in the New York Times), Cambodia seemed a lesser issue 
in relation to U.S. interests.
23
  The Administration seemed focused on more pressing issues of 
national interest, and rightly so.  With the lack of media interest, combined with only a handful 
of letters from the American people seeking answers concerning Cambodian refugees, the 
importance of intervening in Cambodia slipped below that of those issues in which the American 
media and public primarily focused.
24
 
 In December of 1978, Carter announced the projected normalization of relations with 
China to take effect on January 1, 1979.  This announcement fell upon mixed emotions 
concerning the long-awaited diplomatic relations with China.  Many believed this to be a critical 
move in U.S. interests abroad, and especially in Southeast Asia.  Carter’s National Security 
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, acknowledged in his memoirs that “normalization of relations 
with China was a key strategic goal of the new administration” upon entering the White House.
25
  
Immediately following the Camp David Peace Accords in September of 1978, Secretary of State, 
Cyrus Vance, points out that the following day he and Carter met with the Chinese Ambassador 
“to discuss a critical issue about normalization of relations with China.”
26
 This relationship held 
not only a symbolic and monumental importance in U.S. history; it also advanced U.S. securities 
and interests in Asia. 
 As the relationship developed between the U.S. and China, the Carter Administration 
fully understood the importance of nurturing its growth.  In Carter’s address to the nation 
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announcing normalization, he emphasized that the supreme purpose for both nations was for “the 
advancement of peace,” and that the normalization of relations would benefit both nations 
culturally and commercially.
27
  Carter also expresses his view that the normalization of relations 
would contribute to a peaceful settling of relations in both Asia and throughout the world.
28
  
Although the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and China claimed its roots in the 
advancement of peace and prosperity, geopolitical considerations must be examined as well, 
especially in relation to the lack of implementation of the human rights policy within Cambodia. 
The reality of the normalization of relations with China forced a heavy shift toward 
realism in Carter’s foreign policy.  Carter set out to tackle human rights with a policy based on 
idealism and “the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states.”
29
  The vision of foreign 
policy laid out in Carter’s campaign and early rhetoric was “built on morality, American ideals, 
and humanitarian world order politics.”
30
  Carter was convinced, arguably naively, that the 
idealistic nature of his human rights policy would overcome issues of the inherently realistic 
pursuit of national interests that directed the familiar concerns in international relations.  “The 
whole of what the Carter administration said and did reveal[ed] a policy synthesis adjusted to the 
limitations of the world as it was, but guided by the principles that describe[d] how it ought to 
be.”
31
  The dualistic nature of the human rights policy led the administration to consider each 
nation and situation individually, inevitably creating an evolving policy that enabled the 
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administration to consider its placement among a larger perspective of foreign policy, and adjust 
as necessary. 
The shift in the rhetoric of U.S. policy toward national interests raised many questions 
concerning human rights violations in Cambodia.  “Pol Pot’s regime was despicable, but it was 
allied with China, which the United States now supported.”
32
  This meant that the administration 
had to consider China and its support of the Democratic Kampuchea within a different context 
than that of an unaligned U.S.-China policy.  Although the administration initially spoke out 
about China’s close ties to the Khmer Rouge, the subject of Cambodia and human rights quickly 
faded after normalization occurred.
33
  Brzezinski referred to the combination of principle and 
power within U.S. foreign policy as an integral part of a “successful American foreign policy.”
34
  
The principle lay in the human rights policy, while the power, arguably the most important 
aspect concerning U.S. national interest and security, undermined principle in all occasions 
concerning Cambodia.  But the question remains whether or not the human rights policy would 
have been applied to Cambodia in the absence of normalization of relations with China. 
Many considerations must be taken into account when examining U.S. human rights 
policy in relation to security and geopolitical interests in Southeast Asia, primarily the timing of 
the Khmer Rouge coming to power, the inauguration of Jimmy Carter, and the normalization of 
relations with China.  In September 1977, Brzezinski received a memo concerning the situation 
in Cambodia.  It implied that the atrocities committed by the Pol Pot regime mostly occurred 
prior to the Carter Administration’s taking over.  “Most of the upheaval and the executions that 
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did take place, occurred in the first year.  The past year has been relatively quiet, except for 
reports of a purge with mass executions and arrests which apparently took place in March.”
35
  
Although the administration continued to closely observe the events taking place within 
Cambodia, commenting in 1978 that “the human rights situation in Cambodia is indeed 
abominable,” no action was taken.
36
  The argument remains that Cambodia’s relatively small 
size geographically, and inability to project power meant that the country was “not perceived by 
Carter as being vital to American security.”
37
  In addition, the lack of any formal or informal 
relationship between the United States and Cambodia suggested that the U.S. held no influence 
over the actions of the Khmer Rouge within Cambodian borders. 
The inability, or unwillingness, of the Carter administration to respond to the human 
rights violations in Cambodia garnered much criticism from Carter’s opponents and supporters 
alike.  The vigor for human rights policy decreased throughout Carter’s presidency.  One critic 
accused the members of the administration of being “much more critical of right-wing 
dictatorships than those of the left.”  This raised the fear that the “domestic criticism of the 
period of … virtual silence on Cambodia” would discredit the human rights policy abroad.
38
  As 
the administration struggled with the importance of the human rights policy and its applicability 
in Cambodia, it began a humanitarian campaign to send aid to Cambodia following the 1978 
Vietnamese invasion and seizing of Phnom Penh.  First Lady Rosalynn Carter visited refugee 
camps along the Thai border in late 1979, “to dramatize the American commitment to relief-and 
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Mrs. Carter’s energetic involvement was a significant factor in galvanizing the U.S. response.”
39
  
These humanitarian concerns involved the U.S. in the relief effort of a brutalized Cambodia, yet 
allowed the country to remain unaffected by Carter’s human rights policy. 
Critics remained unimpressed by the effort Carter made to employ the human rights 
policy in Cambodia.
40
  “In the end, Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy proved to be 
unsatisfactory to both realists and idealists because rather than ardently embracing either extreme 
the Carter Administration attempted to strike a balance between national interests and morality, 
or between power and principle,” as Brzezinski put it.
41
  This was the dilemma of placing a 
human rights policy as the leading policy in dealing in international relations.  The balancing act 
between idealism and realism was (and still is) one that was easily tipped in favor of prevailing 
self-interest.  “Geopolitical factors and national security interests” played a major role in the 
Administration’s “fashioning its human rights policy.”
42
  Ultimately, realism and self-interest 
became the defining factors that shaped human rights policy, an antithesis to Carter’s fervent 
approach to foreign policy as a presidential candidate and newly sworn in president. 
Carter thoroughly believed in his human rights policy.  Although he maintained 
confidence in its applicability, he also realized the implications of introducing human rights as 
the “soul” initiative in foreign policy.  Even with its enthusiastic integration, the human rights 
policy would never become the “sole determining factor in defining national interest.”
43
  This did 
not deter the administration’s attempt at what Brzezinski called “attacking the problems at their 
most basic level,” whereas “the United States would thus become engaged in shaping a world 
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more congenial to [its] values and more compatible with [its] interests.”
44
  In Southeast Asia, 
though, the compatibility of interests seemed to overwhelm the congeniality of values. 
To give first priority to the geopolitical advantages inherent in 
normalizing relations with China, however, belied the Carter 
Administration’s insistence that concern for human rights was the 
primary determinant in its foreign policy.  To many, the policy of 
seeking to normalize relations with China without calling on its 




In fact, the Carter administration’s blatant disregard for human rights abuses in Cambodia 
appeared most prominently with its 1979 vote to seat the Democratic Kampuchea, headed by Pol 
Pot, as the formally recognized government of Cambodia within the United Nations.  Secretary 
of State, Cyrus Vance, lamented this decision in his memoirs saying, “there are times when your 
obligations as a senior government official force you to take a position which, although essential 
for our national interests, is at the same time extremely distasteful.”
46
  He then confesses the 
importance of siding with the ASEAN nations, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, China, France, 
the United Kingdom, and other European nations in this vote, as not to isolate the U.S. from its 
allies.  This vote represented “the only decision consistent with [the] overall national interests, 




 Self-interest and geopolitical considerations exceeded the importance of enforcing the 
human rights policy in every instance within Southeast Asia.  Carter’s human rights policy did 
not have the strength to defy the institutionalized realism that existed in American foreign policy.  
The issues of Carter’s administration, while many were not limited to it alone, required policies 
that would take effect upon implementation.  The human rights policy promised long term 
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success, but was unable to provide transformations that the world needed immediately.  The 
immediacy of policies based in realism was more easily quantifiable than those spread out over a 
long period of slow, implemented change.  In foreign policy and government, the payoff is 
expected almost instantly.  In Cambodia, there was no other option for implementation of 
Carter’s human rights policy.  The Carter administration saw the enormous potential in 
normalizing relations with China, and if that meant leaving Cambodia to its own self-
determination, the members of the administration were willing to tip the balance in favor of self-
interest and realism.  The human rights policy should not be discredited, although the claims of 
its leading the administration’s foreign policy were hollow.  It was a policy that was considered 
when dealing with other countries and one that raised awareness around the world for human 
rights.  In this way, the human rights policy was extremely successful.  It may not have satisfied 
the intended role, but it accomplished the goal of prompting attention to human rights in 
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